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ARTICLES
The Future of Environmental Law: Adjusting
Expectations After Tahoe-Sierra
ROBERT J. GOLDSTEIN*
David Sive likes to tell the story of how a loose-knit group of
hikers, enraged at the prospect of losing Storm King Mountain to
an energy-generating reservoir, backed litigation that preserved a
natural wonder for the sake of its own beauty.1 He also points to a
conference of litigators, where the term "environmental law" was
coined. 2 I have no reason to discount these stories, having heard
others verify them; they might even be described as the "founding
of environmental law."3 The claim is perhaps exaggerated, but in
its overstatement lie the seeds of truth. Environmental law was
born as a child of litigation, the spawn of a few prescient prece-
dents that allowed it to survive in the absence of positive law.4
The positive law was soon to come. It grew encompassing
statute after statute, and currently includes over thirty-three lat-
eral inches of text in the Code of Federal Regulations.5 Some
called it command and control regulation. 6 Whatever we think of
it, it is voluminous, yet its effects ebb and flow with the political
* Visiting Professor of Law, United States Military Academy, West Point.
1. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (holding that the Federal Power Commis-
sion failed to adequately consider several important factors in its decision to grant a
license for the development of a hydroelectric project).
2. Interview with David R. Sive, Professor, Pace Law School, in White Plains,
NY (May 6, 1997). See also William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in
the History of Environmental Law: The Who's, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 1 n.93 (1999).
3. Id. at 14.
4. There was positive law that was used to protect environmental interests, such
as the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (1994)), there was a
dearth of environmental law per se.
5. C.F.R. Title 40, Protection of the Environment, alone, measures over 33 in-
ches, while Title 26, Internal Revenue, measures a mere 221/4 inches.
6. The term is probably derived from the military phrase:
[Clommand and control -
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will necessary to enforce its broad-based goals. It has also been
subject to slow-shifting sands of federalism, as the Supreme Court
vacillates between federal dominance and devolution. 7 Positive
environmental law has solved many of the problems that faced the
country during the days when rivers caught fire8 and DDT found
its way into the fat tissue of most Americans. 9 These laws and
regulations have undoubtedly remained with us, even as the most
hostile Congress was unwilling (and unable) to retreat from
them.10
The real question is what comes next? Do we rely on the wan-
ing ability of citizen suit standing to litigate future environmental
protections,'1 or do we expand upon the existing regulations that
have, arguably, made inroads in curbing pollution and preserving
ecosystems? I would argue that each of these avenues will have
its place in the future of environmental law, but the next phase of
environmental law must address the issue of what we do on our
land. In examining our relationship to the land, it will be neces-
sary to inculcate the science of ecology and environmental ethics 12
(DOD) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of
the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinat-
ing, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the
mission. Also called C2.
JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, at
http://www.dtic.mildoctrine/jel/doddict/data/c/01075.html (last visited May 7, 2002).
7. See generally RICHARD L. REVESZ, Federalism and Environmental Regulation:
An Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT 374 (2000).
8. See generally A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLLUTION (Adam Markham ed., 1994).
9. John Barker & Robert J. Goldstein, The DDT Paradigm and Electromagnetic
Fields: Policy and Scientific Uncertainty, 17(4) J. PROD. & ToxIcs LIAB. 285, 286
(1995).
10. See generally NEWT GINGRICH & RICHARD K. ARMEY, CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE
REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION. (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
11. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges
"Take Care" of Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-In-Fact, Private "En-
forcers," and Lessons From Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93 (2001)
12. An environmental ethic is an understanding that in an ecosystem every action
taken has consequences; those consequences may be adjudged as positive or negative
values based on the needs of society; and that persons must act as stewards of their
domain, whether that domain be their "owned" real property or some lesser interest,
to prevent actions that cause negative consequences. Robert J. Goldstein, Green
Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real
Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347 (1998). For a traditional definition of
the land ethic, see ALDO LEOPOLD, SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, 237-264 (1990).
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into regulations that apply those principles to both public and pri-
vate lands. To do so would mandate a degree of eco-steward-
ship. 13
The future of environmental law will involve the translation
of the scientific principles of ecology and the ethical teachings of
environmental ethics into positive law. As this positive law is ap-
plied to private land, the translation will necessarily involve an
adjustment of the expectation of private landowners. This adjust-
ment may be relatively insignificant as applied in many cases, but
in theory, is nonetheless profound. Perhaps, the greatest barrier
to the application of mandatory eco-stewardship to private lands
has been the application of the regulatory takings doctrine. This,
however, may have changed.
The Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 14 may have opened the
door for regulation that mandates eco-stewardship of land. In
that case, the Court denied the petitioner's argument for a cate-
gorical rule in the imposition of a moratorium on development
that would have been akin to a physical takings analysis. 15 Al-
though current Supreme Court jurisprudence had been seen as ex-
panding the regulatory takings doctrine to a point where it
resembled the doctrine of physical takings, the Tahoe-Sierra Pres-
ervation case seems to have abruptly halted that trend.16 This de-
cision should allow a fact sensitive inquiry of regulatory takings
cases, wherein the adjustment of expectations is examined and
ratified, as long as the regulation does not result in a "complete
elimination of value."1 7 That test, the legacy of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,'8 was limited to "the extraordinary cir-
13. I do not take credit for this term, which according to my best information has
been used in several earlier texts. See, e.g., Bill Belleville, Off Cuba's Coastline Could
Be A Paradise Lost; Cuba's Fledgling Tourism Industry Threatens To Disrupt Its
Ecosystem That, In Turn, Will Affect Our Ecosystem, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 19,
1998, at G1. I will, however, define the term to mean the use of the science of ecology
and environmental ethics to manage land. This adds an objective dimension to the
concept of "wise use" or "wise stewardship." See Denmark v. Norway, 1993 I.C.J. 38
(Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry at 274). See also Scott W. Hardt, Federal
Land Management in the Twenty-First Century: From Wise Use to Wise Stewardship,
18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 355 (1994).
14. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct.
1465 (2002).
15. Id. at 1478.
16. "[W~e do not apply our precedent from the physical takings context to regula-
tory takings claims." Id. at 1479.
17. Id. at 1483.
18. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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cumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of
land is permitted."19 This approach taken by the Court leads to
the acceptance of regulations that are based on realistic expecta-
tions implicitly including those grounded in ecology and environ-
mental ethics, which after fact-specific inquiry,20 will be analyzed
under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.2 1 "The
Penn Central analysis involves 'a complex of factors including the
regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which
the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectation, and the character of the government action." 22 The ap-
plication of this analysis, with its concomitant scrutiny of the facts
that underlie the landowner's expectation, supports reasonable
environmental regulation that results in adjusting expectations.
Also critical in its decision, the Court noted that the courts
must look at "the parcel as a whole,"23 noting that "where an
owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction
of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking."24 These two con-
cepts, although grouped together by the Court, are actually quite
distinct. The Court's mandate to look at the parcel as a whole re-
quires any person claiming a regulatory taking to show that the
taking is of the entire parcel, not merely portions of it. The Court
defines the parcel as physical and temporal.25 For example, a
court must consider both the uplands and wetlands owned by a
landowner complaining of a regulatory taking based on a prohibi-
tion on building in the wetland. The Court's reference to the bun-
dle of property rights, means no stick is essential, unless its
removal from the bundle amounts to a physical exclusion from the
property.26 Thus, adjusting the expectations of a landowner, by
19. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483 (emphasis added). The Court further limited
the application of the Lucas "categorical rule," noting that it "would not apply if the
diminution in value were 95% instead of 100%." Id.
20. Id.
21. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, n.10 (2002) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)).
23. Id. at 1481
24. Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 at 65-66 (1979)). For a history of the
bundle concepts, and an analysis of the 'strands' or 'sticks' see Goldstein, supra note
12, at 347.
25. 122 S. Ct. at 1484.
26. See id. The bundle is valuable for its notion of divisibility and accumulation of
diverse and varying "sticks" that can amount to ownership. There seems to be no
fixed formulation for when these incidents rise to the level that some term 'owner-
ship.' This is perhaps the strong point of the metaphor, rather than a weakness, in
that it makes such an inquiry fact-sensitive.
[Vol. 19492
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definition, implies the modification of these 'strands' and, at
worst, the destruction of a particular 'strand,' but not the whole-
sale destruction of the entire bundle.
Clearly, the Court no longer defines an adjustment of expecta-
tions, based on mandated eco-stewardship, as a per se regulatory
taking, and therefore, it can now pass Constitutional muster.2 7
What adjusting expectations does, or put more precisely, what it
contemplates is a limitation on expectations from real property in
the economic sense, that limits reasonable return from real prop-
erty to uses that are within the physical realities of land that are
derived from ecology, 28 and the societal limitations that are im-
posed on land. Together these can be labeled: Environmental
context.29
Ecological Realities
With the specter of the "categorical rule" of takings re-
moved,30 consideration must be paid to the requirements of fair-
ness and justice that underlie the Takings Clause of the
Constitution. 31 Maintenance of environmental context based on
positive law and sound ecological science would, ideally, be fair
and just. Prohibiting the filling of a wetland, for example, is
neither unfair nor unjust, not only because the Clean Water Act or
zoning laws prevent it, but also because the owner of the land on
which the wetland sits cannot reasonably expect to utilize that
land in any other manner. In addition, adjacent owners have the
27. See generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, (2002).
28. This view of property, as physically limited by reality, is furthered by the
dicta in Tahoe-Sierra, which notes that "in the analysis of regulatory takings claims,
in such cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.'" Id. at 1481.
29. Justice Brennan in his dissent in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus
wrote:
[diecisions over the past 50 years have developed a coherent, unified in-
terpretation of all the constitutional provisions that may protect economic
expectations and these decisions have recognized a broad latitude in
States to effect even severe interference with existing economic values
when reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare.
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 260 (1978) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978);
Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
30. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1478
31. Id.
20021 493
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reasonable expectation that the wetland will continue to exist and
afford them its benefits.
The lowering of the wetland owner's expectations might be
analogized to a lowering of interest rates-the action is taken in
response to real concerns. In terms of interest rates these might
include business cycles, international business downturns, or the
perceived need to thwart inflation. In lowering real property ex-
pectations, ecological realities can drive a change in what consti-
tutes reasonable expectations. Like a change in the prime rate,
some private property owners will be affected more profoundly
than others, but not without rhyme or reason. Those who are
likely to suffer most would be those who have speculated on prop-
erty that they purchased with an awareness of its physical condi-
tions. Physical conditions are those that the purchaser had legal
cause to take either actual or constructive notice of. These unfor-
tunates are the speculators.
The other class of unfortunates in this scenario includes those
for whom the stochasticity of nature has changed the conditions
that affect their land. 32 These conditions may include the "newly
appearing" critical habitat for an endangered species. Assuming
that these conditions are "newly appearing" rather than simply
ignored or covered up, an inequity is presented that has to be
dealt with.33 The issue is whether economic expectations for land
can be based on the whims of nature. The answer should be self-
evident-economic expectations have always been subject to the
whims of nature. Just look to the devastation wrought by a vol-
32. Alan D. Copsey, The Protection of Wildlife Under Washington's Growth Man-
agement Act, 16 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1101, 1127 (1993).
Ecologists often refer to unpredictable events as "stochastic" events.
Stochasticity denotes probability over a given length of time and covering
a given spatial area. For example, it is impossible to predict when a par-
ticular tree or grove of trees will be toppled by wind or consumed by fire.
But in many forests it is possible to predict with high certainty that fire
or windthrow will occur with a certain frequency and extent throughout
the forest. See, e.g., JAMES R. RUNKLE, DISTURBANCE REGIMES IN TEMPER-
ATE FORESTS, IN THE ECOLOGY OF NATURAL DISTURBANCE AND PATCH DY-
NAMICS 17 (S.T.A. Pickett & P.S. White eds., 1985). The role of
stochasticity in causing extinction is explained in MICHAEL E. GILPIN &
MICHAEL E. SOULE, MINIMUM VIABLE POPULATIONS: PROCESSES OF SPECIES
EXTINCTIONS, IN CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF SCARCITY AND
DIVERSITY 19, 24-33 (Michael E. Soule ed., 1986).
Id. at n.148.
33. "When landowners find an endangered animal on their property, Chuck
Cushman says, the best solution under current law is to 'shoot, shovel and shut up.'"
Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the Endan-
gered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 826 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
494 [Vol. 19
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canic eruption that erases not only the metes and bounds of some-
one's property, but anything resembling human habitation from
its path.34 Hurricanes, like Andrew in South Florida, devastate
without regard to expectation. 35 Flooding by the banks of the
great Mississippi repeatedly overwhelms nearby populations. 36
How are these severe shifts in economic expectations handled by
government? Often with subsidies that make little or no sense be-
cause it encourages development in the very areas that remain
perilous.3 7 The grant of such subsidies does not prevent nature
from running rampant over our economic expectations. 38
If an endangered species makes a nest in one's backyard, be-
sides following the precepts of the Endangered Species Act, the
landowner must now accept the diminished expectation of profits
for their land. Perhaps insurance will become available to cushion
this blow; perhaps it will even be subsidized or underwritten by
the government at some point. Despite the possibility of the afore-
mentioned scenario, the migration of endangered species to the
backyards of middle-class America is a rare, if not an unheard of
occurrence. 39 The more likely scenario respects commercial users
of land that are occasionally "surprised" by an ecological barrier to
34. Pamela G. Hollie, After Volcano, The Logjam, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1980, at Dl.
35. James Barron, Hurricane Andrew: Hurricane Rips Through Florida And
Heads Into Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at Al.
36. Dirk Johnson, The Midwest Flooding: Flood Controls Pushed to Limit By Ris-
ing Water, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1993, at Al.
37. Subsidies that encourage development in flood plains, such as Federal
Flood Insurance have been recently curtailed. In the United States, the
previous availability of inexpensive federal flood insurance subsidized the
development of ecologically rich coastal barrier islands and associated
wetlands. The Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982 eliminated this per-
verse incentive by making developments on barrier islands ineligible for
federal flood insurance, thus transferring the economic risks associated
with building in a flood zone from the government to the private property
owner.
Ian Bowles et al., Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector Conserva-
tion, 8 DuKE ENVTL. L & POL'Y F. 209, 238 (1998) (citing Coastal Barrier Resources
Act, Pub. L. 97-348, 11, 96 Stat. 1659 (1992) (amending National Flood Insurance Act
of 1968, 1321, codified at 42 U.S.C. 4028)); see also Elise Jones, The Coastal Barrier
Resources Act: A Common Cents Approach to Coastal Protection, 21 ENVTL. L. 1015,
1028 (1991)).
38. "Life is a crapshoot," George Burns as God in the movie Oh, God! (1977).
39. See Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on Private
Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419, 440-3 (1994). See generally Sagoff, supra note 33; see
also JASON F. SHOGREN, SAVING HABITATS, PROTECTING HOMES: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1998).
2002] 495
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the realization of expectations. 40 The issue here is how does a gov-
ernment that bases itself on stability and the maintenance of eco-
nomic expectations allow for the alteration of those expectations
based on the forces of nature, which may in some instances be
pure chance? The answer again is patent. Chance plays a huge
role in our economic expectation; in many cases it is the basis for
the accumulation of great wealth. In speculation, which is what
the investment in land should be classified as, the element of
chance is always pertinent to the economic expectations and the
ultimate return.
A distinction has been drawn between "market risks" which
would include "all risks-including the risk of natural events such
as floods-not caused by uncertainty concerning future govern-
ment policies," and "government risks."41 In his analysis of these
"legal transitions"42 Professor Louis Kaplow notes that:
[T]here is little to distinguish losses arising from government
and market risk. For purposes of analyzing risk and incentive
issues, the source of the uncertainty is largely irrelevant. A pri-
vate actor should be indifferent as to whether a given
probability of loss will result from the action of competitors, an
act of government, or an act of God, except to the extent that the
source of the risk will affect the likelihood of compensation or
other relief. But whether the source of risk should determine
the availability of compensation is precisely the issue this anal-
ysis is designed to address. 43
A fire may strike a timber lot and eliminate an entire crop of
wood. 44 This is a less-than-rare possibility in silviculture where
the time required to raise a stand is often measured in scores of
years. Why is it any different when an endangered species nests
40. Little surprise can be claimed by a purchaser of real estate in light of the body
of ecological knowledge and due diligence requirements that are a basic and essential
part of real estate transactions practice since the 1970s.
41. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HAv. L. REV.
509 n.62 (1986).
42. "Most normative legal analysis is devoted to determining which procedures or
policies society should prefer. Any divergence between proposed solutions and the
current legal regime raises the question of how the gains and losses caused by the
transition to the more desirable system should be addressed." Kaplow, supra note 41,
at 511.
43. Id. at 534-535 (footnotes omitted).
44. "Remember chestnut blight? The disease that swept the country 50 years ago
and eventually killed every American chestnut tree, eliminating not just a species but
chestnut lumber and furniture jobs as well?" Pam Sohn, Nation Under Alien Attack;
Plants, Insects Costly Burden, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Aug. 17, 1998, at Al.
[Vol. 19
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/2
2002] THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
in the stand during that time? What if the wood raised is no
longer of commercial interest sixty years after it was planted?
What if the main use of the wood has become illegal, or unpopu-
lar? These questions raise little distinction in a change in eco-
nomic expectation brought about for ecological reasons. Indeed,
as we can now see, ecological reasons for changes in our expecta-
tion may be the most sensible of all, as they protect us from what
could be global devastation, and at the very least protect the "in-
vestment" for the future.
The addition of cognizance of adjusting expectations and its
effect on economic expectation is not an unreasonable application
of the theory; especially in light of the uncertainties that con-
stantly face us in this ever-changing world.
Untangling Expectations
In criticizing the decision in Lucas, Professor Richard A. Ep-
stein notes that "[o]nly one thing is relevant: The greater the tak-
ing, the greater the payment. What is taken is what counts; what
is retained, or the ratio between the retained and taken property,
is irrelevant."45 He saw this equivocation between partial and to-
tal takings as leading to "massive doctrinal discontinuities. 46 The
Tahoe-Sierra decision has apparently untangled this discontinuity
by its bold adherence to the principle that even the destruction of
a 'strand' in the bundle of rights, does not effect a taking.
But when a 'strand' from the bundle is destroyed, what is
taken? Based on a theory that takes into account the adjusting of
expectations, regulation based on the ecological realities of the
land in question takes nothing47 The landowner did not own
these sticks in the bundle so their identification by regulation, or
as a component of environmental context, has not affected his
rights.48 With regard to private law, Epstein writes, "the parties
are often explicit about whether or not an expectation will be pro-
45. Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web
of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1375 (1993).
46. Id. at 1376.
47. "To prevent by regulation that which is forbidden in the first instance under
the laws relating to the use of private property is not a taking." Erb v. Maryland
Dept. of the Env't, 676 A.2d 1017, 1028 (Md. Ct. of Spec. App. 1995). "Simply stated,
there exist properties that are unbuildable, whether or not regulated, due to legiti-
mate health and/or nuisance concerns." Id.
48. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S.
Ct. 1465, 1481 (2002). "[We affirmed that 'where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking.'" Id.
497
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tected by a legal remedy. If so, then there is a right; if not, there is
none."49 With regard to expectations that are implicit, Epstein ad-
mits that "[d]etermining the relationship between expectations
and property rights is more difficult in the absence of any authori-
tative pronouncement on the subject."50 Epstein elaborates this
point with two examples drawn from contract law and tort law,
but fails to enlighten us on the property law implications of im-
plicit expectations. The failure stems not from a fault in reason-
ing, but rather from a divergence of philosophy. Without
justification, Epstein postulates that "[t]he baseline that allows all
use of property is surely a better starting point than the alterna-
tive that allows none."51 This assumption is a value judgment
that presumes that use is better than nonuse. This premise is the
point of divergence for a discourse that is irreconcilable. It as-
sumes that the rights of the owner trump the rights of the neigh-
bor, again the question of whose property rights arises.
With the barriers lowered, the implementation of eco-stew-
ardship can become a priority. Many of the tools to do this are
already in place in the form of land use laws.52 Additionally, the
Tahoe-Sierra decision should embolden both legislative action and
administrative rulemaking efforts in enacting mandatory eco-
stewardship provisions.
While it is beyond the scope of this short article to describe
the implementation of mandatory eco-stewardship, the effect of
existing regulation on the expectations of landowners is evident
from the majority's adoption of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
analysis in her concurring opinion in the Palazzolo case. 53 In that
opinion she notes the implication of timing of a particular regula-
tion in the Penn Central analysis, noting that "[c]ourts properly
consider the effect of existing regulations under the rubric of in-
vestment-backed expectations in determining whether a compen-
sable taking has occurred. ''54 The Tahoe-Sierra Court implies
that existing environmental regulations are a factor in the reason-
able expectations. 55 In doing so, the Court gives cognizance to the
49. Epstein, supra note 45, at 1380.
50. Id. at 1381.
51. Id. at 1386.
52. See generally Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Sur-
vival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2158 (2002).
53. 533 U.S. at 616.
54. Id. at 635-6.
55. See generally Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465.
498 [Vol. 19
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importance of environmental regulation, according it a crucial
place in one's investment-backed expectations.
Conclusion
When I conceived of this article, I thought that it might muse
about the direction that environmental law could take beyond liti-
gation and regulation in the future. The decision in the Tahoe-
Sierra case emboldened me to prognosticate about where that fu-
ture might lie. The doctrine of regulatory takings has always
seemed to be a barrier to reaching the goal of mandatory eco-stew-
ardship. Now it seems less so. The ability to limit the "property
rights" of landowners in a legitimate attempt to address environ-
mental problems will now focus on a fairness and justice inquiry
that will look at realistic expectations.
11
